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Abstract
This study considers the timing of environmental policies with a consumer-friendly firm having abate-
ment technology, and compares two market-based regulations: tradable permits and emission tax regu-
lations. When the government can credibly commit its policy, we show that the equilibrium outcomes
under both policies are equivalent in terms of permits price and tax rate. Under the non-committed
policy, however, the equivalence breaks down because firms have different incentives to induce time-
consistent policy to be adjusted ex post. In particular, compared to pre-committed government, firms
abate less emission to induce higher emission quotas under the permits policy while a consumer-friendly
firm abates more emissions to reduce tax rate under the tax policy. Finally, we show that tax policy
can induce higher welfare and lower environmental damage when the concern on consumer surplus is
moderate.
Keywords: abatement technology; consumer-friendly firm; environmental policy; tradable permits;
emission tax
JEL classification: L13; L31; Q5
1. Introduction
During the last generation, the waves of market-based environmental protection have been salient
features of economic policies in polluting industries around the world. In light of the increasing impor-
tance of such environmental policy, the government has continuously conducted various environmental
regulation by using emission standards, quotas, subsidies, taxes and tradable permits. In particular, the5
widespread acceptance of permits trading program generates an interesting debate among researchers
on the efficiency of environmental and climate change policy.1 Many economists have shown that
1Kato (2006) introduced some useful real-world discussions on the tradable emission permits as climate change policy
instrument in the United Nations. Since the United States implemented permits trading system experimentally in 1980s,
many countries including the European Union and China introduced this program gradually during the last decade.
Nowadays, it becomes a successful international experiment for controlling a large amount of greenhouse gases in the
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governments can promote social welfare by implementing market allocation of tradable permits or,
equivalently, emission taxes since they can minimize abatement costs when they differ between firms.2
Recent works on tradable permits have been conducted in a different situation of mixed market10
where the objectives among firms differ. For example, Kato (2006, 2011) examined a standard mixed
market where a welfare-maximizing public firm competes with private firms whose objectives are to
maximize profits with homogeneous products in the same market.3 He showed that this asymmetry in
their objectives can work for improving social welfare even if the abatement technologies are the same
because tradable permits can induce the equalization of the marginal costs among firms.15
The present paper extends the analysis into the other context of mixed market which are char-
acterized by the co-existence of for-profit firms and not-for-profit firms. In particular, we consider a
consumer-friendly firm which competes with a for-profit firm in a mixed duopoly market under the
same abatement technologies. We define the objective of the consumer-friendly firm as a combination
of consumer surplus and its profits. Thus, the firm puts a higher weight on output in order to commit20
to a higher output than rival firm. This type of formulation can be viewed as one way of adopting
corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives, in which it utilizes consumer surplus as a proxy of
CSR concern.4 Owing to the current expansion of CSR, the heterogeneity of objectives among the
firms in this mixed market configuration is an essential part of our analysis.
This study examines tradable permits policy and compares its efficiency with that of emission tax25
policy in the presence of a consumer-friendly firm. Further, we allow the possible ability of a govern-
ment to commit credibly to an environmental policy when a pollution-reducing abatement activity is
present. When the government determines its policy ex-ante, i.e., before the firms make their abatement
decisions, it can be credible only when the regulator possesses a commitment mechanism. Thus, if the
government can commit the level of permits or tax, both policies are fully equivalent under perfect30
competition. However, once abatement has been chosen by the firms, the optimal policy determined
ex-ante is not ex-post optimal. This is because firms’ abatement costs are already sunk and thus the
world.
2For example, Borenstein (1988), Malueg (1990) and Sartzetakis (1997) showed that the tradable permits can increase
social welfare in the competitive production and emission markets when there are differences with respect to the abatement
technologies among regulated firms. However, Requate (1993), Sartzetakis (2004) and Lee and Park (2005) demonstrated
that if firms differ in both production and abatement technologies, the tradable permits cannot always assure efficiency.
3On the other hand, recent works on mixed markets with environmental tax policies can be found in Ohori (2006),
Wang and Wang (2009), Pal and Saha (2015), Xu and Lee (2015, 2018) and Xu et al. (2016).
4Numerous theoretical studies have recently analyzed this type of formulation for analyzing the CSR activities in
different competition models. For example, see Goering (2012, 2014), Kopel and Brand (2012), Chang et al. (2014),
Matsumura and Ogawa (2014), Brand and Grothe (2015) and Lambertini and Tampieri (2015) among others.
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ex post government objective function differs from the ex-ante. Thus, such policies which require firms
to invest may be subject to a time-inconsistency problem. It resembles a hold-up problem, caused
by the strategic behavior of firms. Therefore, if the government cannot react to the firm’s abatement35
activities, the equivalence of both policies might break down. This suggests that the ability of credible
commitment to an environmental policy in the policy-making process has significant implications to
support the equivalence between the two policies associated with a committed policy.
In the previous literature of environmental economics, Denicolo` (1999), Gersbach and Glazer (1999),
Requate and Unold (2003) investigated the commitment problem when the regulator is not able to com-40
mit credibly to permits policy and shed light on the ex ante and ex post welfare effects of strategic
behaviors of the regulated firms. Petrakis and Xepapadeas (1999, 2001) and Poyago-Theotoky and
Teerasuwannajak (2002) pointed out the time-inconsistency problem under emission tax policy and
showed that if the regulator cannot commit credibly to the stringency of the tax, firms have strategic
incentives because the regulator has an ex-post possibility to ratchet up regulation. D’Amato and Di-45
jkstra (2015) also examined environmental technology adoption with/without long-term commitment
in which the government ex-ante commits a tax rate before the innovation takes place or adjusts an
ex-post tax rate after the firms invest.5 Regarding the strategic choices in a dynamic setting with
comparison between taxes (price regulation) and permits (quantity regulation), Montero (2011), Wirl
(2014) and Moner-Colonques and Rubio (2015) examined firm’s innovation incentives when the govern-50
ment has time-consistent temptations to revise its policy design after innovation and showed that the
performance of two policy instruments differ.
The present paper adopts the recent analysis of the comparison between the two market-based
environmental policies, tradable permits and emission tax policies, in a mixed duopoly with a consumer-
friendly firm in order to examine the efficiency between committed ex-ante policy and non-committed55
ex-post policy. As a closely related work, Moner-Colonques and Rubio (2015) examined the timing of
the environmental policy in a private duopoly model where both firms have the same profit functions,
and showed that the welfare results between emission standard and emission tax depend on the efficiency
of abatement technology. However, our analysis considers a mixed duopoly model where both firms have
asymmetric payoff functions, and examines trading emission permits policy rather than non-tradable60
emission permits policy. Hence, these two differences lead to different policy implications.
Under the committed policy, we show that the equilibrium outcomes under both policies are equiv-
alent in terms of permit price and tax rate. We also show that both permits price and tax increase as
5Recent analysis of the timing of ex-post tax policies in mixed oligopolies can be found in Xu et al. (2017), Hsu et al.
(2017), Lian et al. (2018), Leal et al. (2018) and Lee et al. (2018).
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the concern on consumer surplus rises because higher productions from the larger concern on consumer
surplus cause higher total emissions. Further, we show that both firms can earn higher profits with65
permits rather than a tax, but the profit of a consumer-friendly firm is always larger than rival’s profit ir-
respective of policy instruments. However, both welfare and environmental damage are simultaneously
decreasing or increasing depending on the degree of consumer-friendliness. Thus, higher asymmetry
between the firms might result in the welfare loss, which can outweigh the gains obtained from the
environmental regulation. This result represents a typical trade-off between welfare and environmental70
damage under the committed policy regime.
We also compare permits and tax policies under the non-committed policy and show that some
results under the committed policy still hold. However, we also find several different results in which
the equivalence breaks down.
First, both market price of permits and tax rate increase as the concern on consumer surplus rises75
but permits price is always higher than the tax rate. This is because firms have different incentives to
induce ex-post time-consistent policy under the non-committed policy. In particular, compared to the
outcomes under the committed policy, both firms reduce abatement levels under the permits policy to
increase their emission quotas unless the concern is too large while a consumer-friendly firm increases
its abatement levels under the tax policy to reduce tax rate unless the concern is too small. Thus, the80
significance of strategic incentives of the firms affect the equivalence properties of both policies.
Second, the abatement activities and emissions of a consumer-friendly firm are always larger than
those of a for-profit firm, but its relative amounts depend on the concern on consumer surplus and
policy instruments. In particular, both firms’ abatement activities under permits are always lower than
tax, and thus, total emissions under permits might be more significant than those under tax when the85
consumer-friendliness is high.
Finally, under both policies, it is possible that welfare increases but environmental damage decreases
when the consumer-friendliness is not too large. This result sharply contrasts to the result under the
committed policy. Furthermore, under the non-committed policy, tax policy induces higher welfare
and lower environmental damage than permits policy when the consumer-friendliness is moderate.90
Therefore, due to the larger time-consistent distortion of abatement activities with permits policy, tax
can be a better policy than permits in the presence of a consumer-friendly firm.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we formulate a Cournot duopoly
model with a consumer-friendly firm having abatement technology. We analyze tradable permits and
tax, respectively, in section 3 and 4. Finally, section 5 compares the results 5 and provide main finings.95
Section 6 concludes the paper.
4
2. Model
We consider a quantity-setting Cournot duopoly model.6 One of the firms is a consumer-friendly
(CF) firm (hereafter referred to as firm 0) that cares for not only its profits but consumers surplus. The
other is a for-profit (FP) firm (hereafter referred to as firm 1) that maximizes its profits only. Firms sell100
homogeneous output, q0 > 0 and q1 > 0, respectively, at the market clearing price p(Q) = 1−Q where
Q = q0 + q1. We assume that both firms have identical technologies and the production cost function
takes a quadratic form, c(qi) = q
2
i , i ∈ {0, 1}.
Production leads to pollution, ei > 0, but each firm can reduce pollution by undertaking abatement
activities. Suppose that firm i chooses pollution abatement level zi > 0. Then, the emission level can105
be reduced to ei = qi − zi by investing an amount of z
2
i
2 in abatement.
7
The government has a responsibility to regulate emissions. We consider two policy options that the
regulator may use to protect the environment. The first policy is a tradable permits regulation: The
government decides the total emission levels to maximize the social welfare and then assigns emission
quotas (permits) Ei to each firm. At the same time, the government allows the firms to trade emission110
permits at the emission trading market.8 We assumed that the emission trading market is competitive
and thus the emission trading occurs by the market clearing price.9 Thus, if we define the net demand
of firm i as Di = ei − Ei, total net demand of emission permits is zero at the market equilibrium
D0 +D1 = 0.
The profit of firm i is given by:
pii = p · qi − q2i −
1
2
z2i − λ ·
(
ei − Ei
)
, i = 0, 1 (1)
The second policy consists in an emission tax regulation: The government imposes a tax on the
emission level, for which the tax rate is t. The resulting total tax revenue collected by the government
is T = t
∑
i ei. The profit of firm i is given by:
pii = p · qi − q2i −
1
2
z2i − t · ei, i = 0, 1 (2)
We assume that the FP firm seeks only for profit maximization. However, the CF firm maximizes
profits plus a fraction of consumer surplus, CS = Q
2
2 . Thus, the payoff that CF firm maximizes is as
6Our model could be extended to the oligopoly model without further insights gained.
7The specific function guarantees the interior solutions in the equilibrium for θ ∈ [0, 1].
8This is the only difference with the command-and-control regulation of assigning emission quotas. We compared
non-tradable emission permits and tradable emission permits policies in Appendix B.
9It implies that both firms do not have market powers in the emission market, but product market is in a duopolistic
competition. Regarding the interaction of a competitive market for emission permits with an imperfectly competitive
product market, see Borenstein (1988), Sartzetakis (1997, 2004), Lee and Park (2005) and Kato (2006).
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follows:
V0 = pi0 + θCS (3)
The parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of concern on consumer surplus that the CF firm has, as115
a CSR-initiative, which is exogenously given.
The extent of environmental damage due to pollution by the industry is given by ED =
(
∑
i ei)
2
2 .
Note that total environmental damage under permits policy with an emission quota Ei to each firm
becomes ED =
(
∑
i Ei)
2
2 . Then, the social welfare is the sum of consumer surplus (CS), the profits of
both firms (pi0 + pi1) and the total taxes collected by the government (T) minus environmental damage
(ED):
W = CS + pi0 + pi1 + T − ED (4)
where T = 0 if the government implements a tradable permits policy.10
We shall consider two alternative policy regimes, each featuring a three-stage game between a
welfare maximizing regulator and two firms with different objectives. Both policies are analyzed in
the context of committed or non-committed policy. In the committed policy, the regulator sets the120
environmental instrument value such as emission quotas or tax, depending on policy implemented.
Taking the instrument value as given, the firms choose investment in abatement effort simultaneously
and independently. In the non-committed policy, firms first select its abatement level, simultaneously
and independently, and then the regulator sets the emission quotas or tax. Finally, the firms select
output in the third stage.125
10We assume that the government utilizes a grandfathering approach for initial allocating of costless permits to the
firms. It has by far been the dominant allocation approach in practice, both because it can offset the costs of emission
reduction as well as for political reasons. See Stavins (1998) and Fowlie (2010). However, if the government implements
an auctioning for the initial allocating of permits, T is a fixed lump-sum amount and thus we can treat it as a constant
number. On the other hand, while the emission tax revenue can provide double-dividend effect, which can be used for not
only externality but for public finance to eliminate other distorting tax system such as income tax, the emission tax has
its own distorting effects on labor supply, which can have the excess burden as a tax on labor income. In the following
analysis, we ignore these effects of the public finance.
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3. Committed policy
3.1. Tradable emission permits
In the third stage firms 0 and 1 choose their outputs to maximize (3) and (1), respectively. By
solving these problems the equilibrium output as a function of the permit price, λ, is obtained:
q0 =
(3 + θ)(1− λ)
3(5− θ) , q1 =
(3− θ)(1− λ)
3(5− θ) , Q =
2(1− λ)
5− θ (5)
Note that each firm’s output decreases in the permit price. Also if the concern on consumer surplus
rises, the CF firm is more aggressive and thus increases its output while the FP firm decreases the
output. However, the total outputs increases.130
In the second stage, firms choose abatement efforts to maximize their payoffs. Firm 0 chooses z0 that
maximizes (3) while firm 1 chooses z1 that maximizes (1). Solving these problems gives the equilibrium
abatement level as a function of the permit price:
zi = λ, i ∈ {0, 1} (6)
that defines a positive relationship between abatement and the permit price. It simply states that
tradable emission permits make the firm’s marginal cost in abatement equal to the permit price.
Substituting (5) and (6) into the total net demand of the emission quota, where D0+D1 =
∑
i((qi−
zi)− Ei) = 0, yields:
λ =
2− (5− θ) (E0 + E1)
2(6− θ) (7)
One can easily check a negative relationship that the market price of permits is higher if the regulator
reduces the emission quota of firm i, i.e., ∂λ
∂Ei
< 0.
Substituting (7) into (5) and (6), we obtain outputs and abatement levels as functions of the emission
quotas. In this stage the regulator assigns the emission quota to each firm that maximizes social welfare,
given by expression (4). This maximization yields the following condition:
(
1−Q (Ei, Ej)) ∂Q
∂Ej
− 2
1∑
i=0
qi
(
Ei, Ej
) ∂qi
∂Ej
−
1∑
i=0
zi
(
Ei, Ej
) ∂zi
∂Ej
=
1∑
i=0
Ei, j = 0, 1 (8)
where the first term on the left-hand side measures the increase in consumer surplus coming from the135
increase in total market outputs when the regulator raises the emission quotas. The second term stands
for the increase in production cost coming from the increase in each firm’s output, and the third term
stands for the decrease in abatement cost from the decrease in each firm’s abatement effort, respectively,
when the regulator raises the emission quotas. The right-hand side implies the increase in environmental
damages coming from increase in emission quotas.140
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From (8), we obtain the total emission quota
1∑
i=0
Ei =
2
(
63− 18θ − 2θ2)
H
(9)
where H = 909 − 306θ + 29θ2 > 0. When the government sets a non-discriminatory equal emission
quota, we have:11
E
tpc
0 = E
tpc
1 =
63− 18θ − 2θ2
H
(10)
We employ superscript tpc to denote the equilibrium under the tradable permits policy with the com-
mitment. Then, we have
∂E
tpc
i
∂θ
>
<0 if θ
<
>
3
7 . It states that the relationship between the regulator’s optimal
emission quota and the concern on consumer surplus is non-monotonic. When the concern on consumer
surplus is low, the optimal emission quota increases with the concern. However, when the concern on
consumer surplus is increased past a certain level, the optimal emission quota begins decreasing with145
the concern.
From (10) the equilibrium permit price, output, abatement levels and emissions are obtained:
λc =
99− 9θ + 2θ2
H
, ztpc0 = z
tpc
1 = λ
c
qtpc0 =
9(6− θ)(3 + θ)
H
, qtpc1 =
9(6− θ)(3− θ)
H
etpc0 =
63 + 36θ − 11θ2
H
, etpc1 =
63− 72θ + 7θ2
H
(11)
In equilibrium under the committed permits policy, the output of CF firm is larger than that of FP
firm, but both firms make the same abatement effort; therefore the CF firm’s emission level is also
larger than its rival’s. Note that
∂qtpc0
∂θ > 0,
∂qtpc1
∂θ < 0 and
∂ztpci
∂θ > 0. Also, we have
∂λc
∂θ > 0. Thus,
the equilibrium permit price increases as the concern on consumer surplus rises. Furthermore, D0 > 0150
which implies that the CF firm buys emission permits.
11In Appendix C, we examine the case where the government sets a discriminatory emission quota under the committed
policy and show that our analysis remains except the firms’ profits. In reality, however, the information burden is quite
demanding for a discriminatory quotas system and also politically it might be very costly to manage the discriminatory
regulation especially under the large number of interest groups. Regarding the informational asymmetry between the
government and firms, Lee (1996) proposed an optional permits regulation while Lee and Kim (1995) and Lee and Kim
(2000) analyzed non-linear emission tax regulations.
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Finally, we have the resulting profits of the firms, environmental damage and social welfare:
pitpc0 =
127251− 76464θ − 8091θ2 + 6732θ3 − 652θ4
2H2
pitpc1 =
127251− 111456θ + 38565θ2 − 5904θ3 + 320θ4
2H2
EDtpc =
2
(
63− 18θ − 2θ2)2
H2
W tpc =
189− 54θ − 6θ2
H
(12)
Proposition 1. pitpc1 < pi
tpc
0 for any 0 < θ ≤ 1;
It states that the profit of CF firm is always larger than that of FP firm in equilibrium under the
committed permits policy. This is because the CF firm is more aggressive in production to increase
consumer surplus, which induces less production of FP firm but more production in total outputs.12155
Proposition 2. ∂ED
tpc
∂θ > 0 and
∂W tpc
∂θ > 0 if 0 ≤ θ < 37
It states that both welfare and environmental damage are increasing in θ unless θ is so high. This
result implies that higher degree of θ might deteriorate the welfare because of excessive production.
This is because trading of emission permits induces excessive output redistribution from the FP firm to
CF firm in controlling emissions. Thus, higher asymmetry between the firms results in the inefficiency,160
which can outweigh the gains obtained from the environmental regulation.13 It also states that both
welfare and environmental damage are simultaneously decreasing or increasing depending on the values
of θ. This result represents a typical trade off between welfare and environmental damage in the
literature.
3.2. Emission tax165
In the third stage, firms choose their outputs to maximize their payoffs in (3) and (2), respectively.
Given the emission tax rate, t, the first-order conditions get the following equilibrium output level of
each firm and total outputs:
q0 =
(3 + θ)(1− t)
3(5− θ) , q1 =
(3− θ)(1− t)
3(5− θ) , Q =
2(1− t)
5− θ (13)
Note that each firm’s output coincides with that under permits policy in (5) if t = λ.
12For more discussion on this point, see Lambertini and Tampieri (2015) and Leal et al. (2018).
13It also happens in a symmetric duopoly when both firms have different costs. For more discussion on this point, see
Borenstein (1988), Malueg (1990) and Sartzetakis (1997).
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In the second stage, firms choose abatement efforts to maximize their payoffs in (3) and (2), respec-
tively. The first-order conditions give the equilibrium abatement levels as a function of the tax:
zi = t, i ∈ {0, 1} (14)
It also defines a positive relationship between abatement and the tax, which also states that emission
tax make the firm’s marginal cost in abatement equal to the tax rate.
In the first stage the government sets the emission tax that maximizes social welfare in (4). Solving
the first-order condition yields the optimal emission tax, which is given by
tc =
99− 9θ + 2θ2
H
(15)
where H is defined as before. We have ∂t
c
∂θ > 0. Thus, the optimal tax increases as the concern on
consumer surplus rises. From (11) and (15), it is easy to check that the equilibrium output, abatement170
and emission levels, environmental damage and social welfare coincide with those of the committed
permit policy. Therefore, under regulatory commitment both policy instruments are equivalent in the
sense that they yield the same equilibrium outcomes.14
The profits of both firms under the committed tax regime are the followings:
pitaxc0 =
114777− 71766θ − 8271θ2 + 6768θ3 − 644θ4
2H2
pitaxc1 =
114777− 106758θ + 38385θ2 − 5868θ3 + 328θ4
2H2
(16)
We employ superscript taxc to denote the equilibrium under the tax policy with the commitment.
Proposition 3. pitaxc1 < pi
taxc
0 for any 0 < θ ≤ 1;175
It states that in equilibrium under the committed tax, the profit of CF firm is always larger than
that of FP firm. This result is the same with that under the committed permit policy.
3.3. Comparing permits and tax
Proposition 4. pitaxc0 < pi
tpc
0 and pi
taxc
1 < pi
tpc
1 for any θ ∈ [0, 1]
Under the committed policy both firms can earn higher profits with permits policy. This is because180
both firms can save tax payments under the same outcomes. It also implies that both firms prefer
permits policy to tax policy when they can choose or lobby for the policy instruments.
14Note that this result does not depend on θ. Moner-Colonques and Rubio (2015) examined the timing of the envi-
ronmental policy in a private duopoly model with symmetric payoff functions, and showed that the equivalence between
emission standard and emission tax holds irrespective of the efficiency of abatement costs and environmental damage
parameter.
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4. Non-committed policy
4.1. Tradable emission permits
The last stage is the same as in subsection 3.1. In the second stage, the regulator assigns the welfare
maximizing emission quota to each firm taking as given the firms’ abatement levels. Welfare defined in
(4) becomes:
W = Q(λ, θ)− Q
2(λ, θ)
2
−
1∑
i=0
q2i (λ, θ)−
1
2
1∑
i=0
z2i − λ
1∑
i=0
Di(Ei; zi, qi(λ, θ))− 1
2
(
1∑
i=0
Ei)
2 (17)
The first-order conditions are:
−λ∂(D0 +D1)
∂Ej
=
1∑
i=0
Ei, j = 0, 1 (18)
where ∂(D0+D1)
∂Ej
= −1. Solving (18) we obtain the total emission quota
1∑
i=0
Ei = λ (19)
Contrary to the committed policy, it defines a positive relationship between emission quotas and the185
permits price, that is, the regulator increases the emission quota in response to an increase in the market
clearing permits price.
Substituting (5) and (18) into the total net demand of the emission quota, where D0 + D1 =∑
i((qi − zi)− Ei) = 0, yields:
λ =
2− (5− θ) (z0 + z1)
7− θ (20)
Contrary to the committed policy, we have a negative relationship that permits price is higher if firm i
reduces its abatement level, i.e., ∂λ∂zi < 0 or if the concern on consumer surplus increases, i.e.,
∂λ
∂θ > 0.
In the first stage, firms choose their abatement efforts taking into account how the regulator is going
to respond. Under the non-discriminatory emission quota,15 where E0 = E1 =
λ
2 , firm 0 chooses z0 that
maximizes (3) while firm 1 chooses z1 that maximizes (1). Solving these problems yields the following
equilibrium abatement levels:
ztpn0 =
2(9− 2θ) (12 + 6θ − θ2)
Ω
ztpn1 =
2(9− θ) (12− 6θ + θ2)
Ω
(21)
15In Appendix C, we also examine the case where the government sets a discriminatory emission quota under the
non-committed policy and show that our analysis remains except the firms’ profits.
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where Ω = (6 − θ)R > R = 432 − 135θ + 11θ2 > 0. We also employ superscript tpn to denote190
the equilibrium under the tradable permits policy with non-commitment. It is easy to show that
ztpn0 > z
tpn
1 . Thus, CF firm is more aggressive in investing abatement technology, which induces a
larger amount of abatement under the non-committed permits policy. Note that
∂ztpn0
∂θ > 0,
∂ztpn1
∂θ < 0,
and
∂(ztpn0 +z
tpn
1 )
∂θ > 0.
From (21), the equilibrium permit price, outputs and emission quotas are obtained:
λn =
2
(
36− 9θ + θ2)
R
, E
tpn
0 = E
tpn
1 =
λn
2
qtpn0 =
3(8− θ)(3 + θ)
R
, qtpn1 =
3(8− θ)(3− θ)
R
,
etpn0 =
216− 42θ + 9θ2 − θ3
(6− θ) (432− 135θ + 11θ2) , e
tpn
1 =
216− 138θ + 21θ2 − θ3
(6− θ) (432− 135θ + 11θ2) (22)
In equilibrium under the non-committed permits policy, the output of CF firm is larger than that of FP195
firm. We can also show that etpn0 > e
tpn
1 in (22). Thus, the emission level of CF firm is larger than that of
FP firm. Note that
∂qtpn0
∂θ > 0,
∂qtpn1
∂θ < 0 and
∂Qtpn
∂θ > 0. Also, we have
∂λn
∂θ > 0 and thus
∂E
tpn
i
∂θ > 0. It
states that in equilibrium under the non-committed permits policy, if the concern on consumer surplus
rises so does the permit price, and the emission quotas set by the regulator. Furthermore, D0 > 0 which
implies that the CF firm buys emission permits.200
Finally, we have the resulting profits of the firms, environmental damage and social welfare:
pitpn0 =
2(268272− 222912θ + 25452θ2 + 17064θ3 − 5625θ4 + 633θ5 − 25θ6)
Ω2
pitpn1 =
2
(
268272− 305856θ + 145548θ2 − 36396θ3 + 5031θ4 − 366θ5 + 11θ6)
Ω2
EDtpn =
2
(
36− 9θ + θ2)2
R2
W tpn =
6
(
225504− 199584θ + 60024θ2 − 6156θ3 − 306θ4 + 99θ5 − 5θ6)
Ω2
(23)
Proposition 5. pitpn1 < pi
tpn
0 for any 0 < θ ≤ 1
It states that in equilibrium under the non-committed permits policy, the profit of CF firm is always
larger than that of FP firm. The economic reason is the same with the committed case where the CF
firm is more aggressive in production, which induces less production of FP firm.
Proposition 6. ∂ED
tpn
∂θ > 0 for any θ ∈ [0, 1] but ∂W
tpn
∂θ
>
<0 if θ
<
>θWtpn ≈ 0.544205
It state that welfare decreases and environmental damage increases as the concern on consumer
surplus increases when θ is large. Thus, the emergence of a consumer-friendly firm is not always
desirable to both the society and environment when its concern on consumer surplus is large under the
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non-committed tradable permits policy. This is because higher degree of θ induces excessive production
of outputs, which deteriorates the welfare, and induces large emission quotas by strategic behaviors,210
which also deteriorates environmental quality. Thus, higher asymmetry between the firms under the
non-committed tradable permits policy results in the welfare loss and environmental damage. This is
sharply contrast to the results in the committed policy.
4.2. Emission tax
The last stage is the same as in subsection 3.2. In the second stage, the regulator chooses the welfare
maximizing emission tax taking as given the firms’ abatement levels. The first order condition of this
problem yields:
t =
9 + 9θ + 2θ2 − 9(5− θ) (z0 + z1)
2 (27 + θ2)
(24)
This expression defines a negative relationship between firms’ abatement investments and the tax, that215
is, the regulator decreases the tax rate in response to an increase in the firms’ abatement levels. Thus,
firms can strategically use its choice of abatement to influence taxation: by increasing investment in
emission-reducing activities, the firms can expect a lower emission tax. Also as the concern on consumer
surplus increases, so does the emission tax.
In the first stage, firms choose their abatement efforts taking into account how the regulator is going
to respond. Firm 0 chooses z0 that maximizes (3) while firm 1 chooses z1 that maximizes (2). Solving
these problems we derive the following optimal abatement efforts:
ztaxn0 =
40095 + 42768θ − 2592θ2 + 1782θ3 + 63θ4 + 4θ6
D
ztaxn1 =
40095− 1944θ + 10530θ2 + 387θ4 + 4θ6
D
(25)
where D = (99− 9θ + 2θ2)S > S = 4779− 729θ + 261θ2 − 27θ3 + 2θ4 > 0. We also employ superscript220
taxn to denote the equilibrium under the tax policy with non-commitment. Then, we have that ztaxn0 >
ztaxn1 . It states that CF firm is more aggressive in investing abatement technology, which induces a
larger amount of total abatement under the tax policy. Unlike the non-committed permits policy, it
is noteworthy that
∂ztaxni
∂θ > 0. Thus, both firms increase more abatement activities under tax policy
when θ increases.225
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From (25), the optimal emission tax, and the equilibrium output and emission levels are obtained:
tn =
243 + 810θ + 171θ2 + 4θ4
2S
qtaxn0 =
9(3 + θ)
(
69− 3θ + 2θ2)
2S
,
qtaxn1 =
9(3− θ) (69− 3θ + 2θ2)
2S
,
etaxn0 =
104247− 48843θ + 6723θ2 − 945θ3 − 234θ4 + 36θ5 − 8θ6
2D
,
etaxn1 =
104247− 82377θ − 2997θ2 − 3915θ3 − 450θ4 − 36θ5 − 8θ6
2D
(26)
In equilibrium under the non-committed tax, the CF firm’s output and abatement levels are larger
than those of the FP firm. But, we have etaxn0 > e
taxn
1 . Thus, the emissions generated by the CF firm
are higher than those generated by the FP firm. Note that
∂qtaxn0
∂θ > 0,
∂qtaxn1
∂θ < 0, and
∂Qtaxn
∂θ > 0.
Also, ∂t
n
∂θ > 0. Thus, the tax rate increases as θ increases.
Finally, we have the resulting profits of the firms, environmental damage and social welfare:16
pitaxn0 =
33373963359 + ψ0
2D2
,
pitaxn1 =
33373963359 + ψ1
2D2
,
EDtaxn =
(
(3− 2θ) (351 + 45θ + 12θ2 + 2θ3))2
2S2
,
W taxn =
3(30801788919 + ψ2)
2D2
(27)
Proposition 7. pitaxn1 < pi
taxn
0 if 0 < θ < θpi ≈ 0.925230
It states that in equilibrium under the non-committed tax policy, the profit of CF firm can be larger
than that of FP firm except the case when the consumer-friendliness is too high. Thus, similarly to
our previous results, higher production by the CF firm leads to higher profits to the CF firm in most
cases of θ. However, if the consumer-friendliness is sufficiently high, higher production induces higher
tax rate, which might reduce the profits of the CF firm more than that of the FP firm. This is contrast235
to our previous results.
Proposition 8. ∂ED
taxn
∂θ < 0, but
∂W taxn
∂θ
>
<0 if θ
<
>θWtaxn ≈ 0.43
It states that welfare increases but environmental damage decreases as the concern on consumer
surplus increases when θ is small. Thus, the emergence of a consumer-friendly firm might be desirable
16For the sake of expositional convenience, we provide ψj (j = 0, 1, 2) in ”Appendix A”
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to both the society and environment when its concern on consumer surplus is small under the non-240
committed tax policy. This is because as θ increases, both firms not only increase outputs production
but undertake more abatement activities strategically under tax policy. However, as θ is higher, exces-
sive production of outputs deteriorates the welfare but induces large abatement activities by strategic
behaviors, which improves environmental quality. This result sharply contrasts to the results under the
non-committed permits policy and committed tax policy.245
4.3. Comparing permits and tax
Proposition 9. tn < tc = λc < λn for any θ ∈ [0, 1]
tn λn tc=λc
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.05
0.10
0.15
Figure 1: Permits price and tax comparison.
Therefore, under the regulator’s inability to commit the equivalence between the two policy in-
struments breaks down.17 In particular, it states that under the non-committed policy where the
time-inconsistency occurs, the optimal tax is smaller than the equilibrium permits price. Figure 1250
shows that both permits price and tax rate increase as the concern on consumer surplus rises. It also
shows that, compared to the equivalent tax rate or permits price, the tax rate becomes smaller and
permits price becomes larger.
This finding also indicates that firms’ strategic incentives depends not only on policy instruments
but the degree of consumer-friendliness. This is because firms would expect the regulator to change its255
17Note that this result does not depend on θ. Moner-Colonques and Rubio (2015) also showed that the equivalence
between emission standard and emission tax breaks down in a private duopoly model when the government cannot commit
the policy.
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policy ex post and thus they have different incentives to induce time-inconsistent policy to be adjusted
ex post. In particular, compared to pre-committed government, firms abate less emission to induce
higher emission quotas under the permits policy while a consumer-friendly firm abates more emissions
to reduce tax rate under the tax policy. We will show these findings in the following proposition.
Proposition 10.260
1. qtaxn0 > q
tpn
0 , q
taxn
1 > q
tpn
1 and Q
taxn > Qtpn for any θ ∈ [0, 1];
2. ztaxn0 > z
tpn
0 , and z
taxn
1 > z
tpn
1 for any θ ∈ [0, 1];
3. etaxn0 < e
tpn
0 and e
taxn
1 < e
tpn
1 if θ > θe ≈ 0.471;
It states that under the non-committed policy, both firms produce more outputs but more abate-
ment investments with tax policy than permits policy. Thus, both firm’s emission levels become more265
significant under permits policy when the concern on consumer surplus is relatively high. Fig. 2 shows
how both firms choose abatement levels strategically by expecting ex-post policies. In particular, under
permits policy, both firms reduce abatement levels unless the concern on consumer surplus is too large,
which induces ex-post permits policy with more emission quotas. Under tax policy, a consumer-friendly
firm increases its abatement levels to reduce tax rate unless the concern on consumer surplus is too270
small, which induces a higher tax rate. Thus, these opposite incentives break down the equivalence
between permits and tax policies.
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Figure 2: Abatement comparison.
Proposition 11. pitaxn0 < pi
tpn
0 and pi
taxn
1 < pi
tpn
1 for any θ ∈ [0, 1].
It implies that under the non-committed policy both firms can earn higher profits with permits
policy due to the strategic effects on ex-post policy. Thus, as like in the committed policy, both firms275
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still prefer permits policy to tax policy when they can choose or lobby for the policy. It also implies
that irrespective of the timing of environmental policies, tradable permits policy can be an endogenous
choice of rent-seeking equilibrium in a political process.18
Proposition 12.
1. EDtaxn < EDtpn for any θED ≈ 0.466577 < θ ≤ 1 where θED satisfies EDtaxn = EDtpn;280
2. W taxn > W tpn for any 0 ≤ θ < θW ≈ 0.957481 where θW satisfies W taxn = W tpn;.
This proposition states that under the non-committed policy, tax policy induces higher welfare
and lower environmental damage than permits policy when the consumer-friendliness is moderate, i.e.,
EDtaxn < EDtpn and W taxn > W tpn if θED < θ < θW . Because there are opposite strategic effects
between the two policies if the government can not make credible pre-commitment, we have larger time-285
consistent distortion of abatement activities with permits policy. Therefore, from the policy perspective
of both welfare and environmental quality, tax policy can be a better policy than permits policy when
the concern on consumer surplus is moderate. Note that the welfare-superiority in the non-committed
tax policy holds when θ = 0 where both firms have the same objectives in a duopoly market.19
5. Concluding remarks290
We provided the analysis of different policy timing with respect to the two environmental regulatory
measures between tradable permits and emission tax in a mixed duopoly with a consumer-friendly firm.
We examined the strategic choices on abatement technologies and showed that the equilibrium outcomes
under both policies are equivalent in terms of permits price and tax rate only when the government can
credibly commit its policy. Also, we showed that the profit of a consumer-friendly firm is always larger295
than rival’s profit but both firms can earn higher profits with permits.
Under the non-committed policy, however, the equivalence breaks down because firms have different
incentives to induce time-inconsistent policy to be adjusted ex post. In particular, compared to pre-
committed government, firms abate less emission to induce higher emission quotas under the permits
policy while a consumer-friendly firm abates more emissions to reduce tax rate under the tax policy.300
18Regarding rent-seeking behaviors over tradable permits policy, Rode (2014) examined the opportunity cost for a
rent-seeking lobby in EU’s CO2 ETS (Emissions Trading System).
19In a private duopoly model Moner-Colonques and Rubio (2015) examined the time-inconsistent problem in both
emission standard and emission tax policy and showed that the welfare-superiority of tax policy over emission standard
depends on the relative efficiency of abatement technology.
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We can summarize our findings under the non-committed policy. First, both firms’ abatement
activities under permits are lower than those under tax, but total emissions under tax are smaller than
those under permits when the concern on consumer surplus is high enough. Second, both permits price
and tax increase as the concern on consumer surplus rises, but due to the strategic incentive to increase
emission quotas under the permits policy, permits price is always higher than the equivalent tax. Finally,305
tax policy induces more outputs, more abatements and less emissions than permits when the concern
on consumer surplus is moderate, and thus tax is a better policy than permits in the presence of a
consumer-friendly firm.
Our findings show that not only the regulator’s inability to commit but the firm’s CSR initiatives can
play significant roles in the design and implementation of environmental policy and have detrimental310
effects on social welfare. However, our analysis has a limitation because of the simple structure of our
modelling with linear demand and quadratic cost functions. Thus, the importance of CSR should be
further examined in more general settings under the alternative market structure with the efficiency
parameter of abatement technology, product differentiation, dominant market power in the permits
market, different timing of the game and so on.20 This has to be left for future research.315
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Appendix A. The values of ψi
ψ0 = −19755079146θ + 1776371067θ2 + 252749403θ3 − 547148034θ4 + 143738388θ5 − 34205409θ6
+ 4527819θ7 − 486567θ8 + 25272θ9 + 360θ10 − 144θ11 + 16θ12;
ψ1 = −28584262773θ + 13764085704θ2 − 3714674175θ3 + 1124686620θ4 − 180945819θ5 + 36948636θ6
− 3873177θ7 + 563193θ8 − 36936θ9 + 4248θ10 − 144θ11 + 16θ12;
ψ2 = −12416587524θ + 3686527485θ2 − 1334901060θ3 + 129078927θ4 − 64796436θ5 + 1012095θ6
− 1744740θ7 − 76626θ8 − 19440θ9 − 3168θ10 − 32θ12
(A.1)
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Appendix B. Non-tradable Emission Permits
We examine non-tradable emission permits (NTEP), in which the government prohibits the firms
from trading emission permits. In this case, each firm can discharge emissions as long as it obeys its
own emission constraint, i.e., ei = qi − zi ≤ E. We derive and compare the equilibrium of committed405
NTEP policy and that of non-committed NTEP policy, respectively. Recall that firms choose qi in the
last stage under the effective regulatory constraint that qi = E + zi.
Appendix B.1. Committed policy
Under ex-ante NTEP, firms choose zi after the government chooses E. Maximization problems of
CF firm and FP firm are given respectively by
Max
z0
pi0 + θCS + µ0
(
E − q0 + z0
)
Max
z1
pi1 + µ1
(
E − q1 + z1
) (B.1)
Let µi be the shadow price of the emission constraint of firm i. Solving the maximization problem
of each firm with the binding constraint, we derive the following equilibrium abatement levels:
z∗0 =
4 + θ − 5E(4− θ)
4(6− θ) z
∗
1 =
4− θ − E(20− 3θ)
4(6− θ) (B.2)
Then, the social welfare under NTEP is
W ∗ =
112− 32θ − 3θ2 − E2 (1616− 544θ + 51θ2)+ E (224− 64θ − 6θ2)
16(6− θ)2 (B.3)
In this stage the regulator assigns the welfare-maximizing emission quota to each firm. Solving (B.3)
yields the optimal emission quota
E
∗
=
112− 32θ − 3θ2
1616− 544θ + 51θ2 (B.4)
Regarding welfare comparisons, we have for any θ ∈ [0, 1]
W ∗(E
∗
)−W tpc = 45(6− θ)
2θ2
(909− 306θ + 29θ2) (1616− 544θ + 51θ2) ≥ 0
W ∗(E
tpc
i )−W tpc =
405(6− θ)2θ2
16 (909− 306θ + 29θ2)2 ≥ 0
W ∗(E
∗
)−W ′(E∗) = 80(6− θ)
2θ2
(1616− 544θ + 51θ2)2 ≥ 0 (B.5)
where W
′
(E
∗
) is obtained inserting (5)-(7) and (B.4) into (4). These results support the findings in Kato
(2006, 2011) who showed that the command-and-control regulation might be superior to market-based410
instruments depending on the firm’s objective function in a mixed market.
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Appendix B.2. Non-committed policy
Under ex-post NTEP, firms choose zi before the government chooses E. Then, the social welfare is
given by
W ∗∗ = 2(1− 3E)E − 2z20 + (1− 4E)z1 − 2z21 + z0
(
1− 4E − z1
)
(B.6)
In the second stage, the regulator assigns the welfare-maximizing emission quota to each firm.
Solving (B.6) yields the optimal emission quota
E =
1
6
(1− 2z0 − 2z1) (B.7)
Finally, making use of qi = E + zi and (B.7) and inserting them into (B.1), firms chooses zi that
solve the maximization problem. This yields the following optimal abatement levels:
z∗∗0 =
3(8 + 5θ)
16(18− θ) and z
∗∗
1 =
24 + θ
16(18− θ) (B.8)
The resulting equilibrium emission quota and welfare are:
E
∗∗
=
4− θ
2(18− θ) , W
∗∗(E
∗∗
) =
3
(
5696− 384θ − 113θ2)
256(18− θ)2 (B.9)
Regarding welfare comparison between ex ante NTEP and ex post NTEP, we have:
W ∗∗(E
∗∗
)−W ∗(E∗) = −3
(
84992 + 32768θ − 242032θ2 − 22432θ3 + 4995θ4)
256(18− θ)2 (1616− 544θ + 51θ2)
>
<
0 if θ
>
<
0.6459.
Therefore, the welfare comparison between ex ante NTEP and ex post NTEP depends on the degree of
consumer-friendliness.
Appendix C. Tradable emission permits with discriminatory quota415
We examine discriminatory emission quota, in which the government allocates emission permits to
the firms differently and then allows firms to trade emission permits. In this case, we assume that
E0 = α
∑1
i=0Ei and E1 = (1−α)
∑1
i=0Ei, where α is exogenously given as 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. We derive and
compare the equilibrium of committed policy and that of non-committed policy, respectively.
Appendix C.1. Committed policy420
Using the total emission quota in (9), we can set E0 = α
2(63−18θ−2θ2)
H and E1 = (1−α)
2(63−18θ−2θ2)
H .
Given that the permit price in (7) depends on the total emission quotas, the equilibrium permit price,
output and abatement levels in (11) remain the same. It is also easy to show that EDtpc and W tpc in
(12) remain as well.
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However, the profits of the firms can be written as follows:
pitpc∗0 =
114777− 71766θ − 8271θ2 + 6768θ3 − 644θ4
2H2
+ αL,
pitpc∗1 =
114777− 106758θ + 38385θ2 − 5868θ3 + 328θ4
2H2
+ (1− α)L. (C.1)
where L = 2(63− 18θ − 2θ2)(99− 9θ + 2θ2)/H2 > 0.425
The difference between the firm’s profits is
pitpc∗0 − pitpc∗1 =
2(−6237 + 11097θ − 11754θ2 + 3177θ3 − 239θ4)
H2
+ 2αL. (C.2)
Let α ≡ 6237−11097θ+11754θ2−3177θ3+239θ42(99−9θ+2θ2)(63−18θ−2θ2) > 0. Note that α is a convex function of θ where α(0) = 12
and α(1) = 12 .
Proposition 13. pitpc∗0 ≥ pitpc∗1 if and only if θ ∈ [0, 1] and α ≤ α ≤ 1.
From equation (16) and (C.1), we have pitpci = pi
taxc
i + λ
cEi, i = 0, 1 where λ
c is the equilibrium
price permit given in (11). This implies that Proposition 4 is satisfied under the discriminatory emission430
quota.
Finally, given that the environmental damage, EDtpc, and welfare, W tpc, are the same that in
equation (12), we can observe that they don’t depend on the distribution of the emission quotas.
Hence, Proposition 2 remains under discriminatory emission quota.
Appendix C.2. Non-committed policy435
Using the total emission quota in (19), we can set E0 = αλ and E1 = (1− α)λ. Then, firms choose
their abatement efforts zi to maximize their objective functions in (3) and (1), respectively:
ztpn∗0 =
396− 21θ − 28θ2 + 3θ3 − 2α(5− θ) (36− 9θ + θ2)
Ω
,
ztpn∗1 =
(12− θ)(3− θ)(1− θ) + 2α(5− θ) (36− 9θ + θ2)
Ω
(C.3)
Since the total abatement of ztpn∗0 +z
tpn∗
1 computed from (C.3) is the same total abatement of z
tpn
0 +
ztpn1 computed from (21), the abatement values of the discriminatory case yield the same equilibrium
permit price, therefore, they yield the same equilibrium outputs as in (22).
The equilibrium emission quotas are however:
E
tpn∗
0 = αλ
n, E
tpn∗
1 = (1− α)λn (C.4)
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By replacing (C.3) and (C.4) in (1), the equilibrium profits are:
pitpn∗0 =
931824− 828360θ + 102735θ2 + 62436θ3 − 21010θ4 + 2368θ5 − 93θ6
+ 4α
(
36− 9θ + θ2) (2412− 681θ − 89θ2 + 41θ3 − 3θ4)− 4α2(5− θ)2 (36− 9θ + θ2)2
2Ω2
pitpn∗1 =
1149552− 1297512θ + 615087θ2 − 153708θ3 + 21290θ4 − 1556θ5 + 47θ6
− 4α (36− 9θ + θ2) (612− 471θ + 161θ2 − 23θ3 + θ4)− 4α2(5− θ)2 (36− 9θ + θ2)2
2Ω2
(C.5)
The difference between the profits of the firms under the discriminatory quota are:
pitpn∗0 − pitpn∗1 =
(
2
(
36− 9θ + θ2) (252− 54θ − 3θ2 + θ3) (6− θ)) (2α−A)
Ω2
(C.6)
where A ≡ 9072−18036θ+18342θ2−5949θ3+771θ4−35θ5(36−9θ+θ2)(252−54θ−3θ2+θ3) . For any 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, we have 0 < A ≤ 1.
Proposition 14. pitpn∗0 ≥ pitpn∗1 if and only if α ≥ A2 , for any 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.440
Regarding profit’s comparison between tradable emission permits with discriminatory quota and
emission tax, we can draw Figure C.3. It shows that the tradable emission permit yields higher profits
to both firms regardless of the degree of consumer-friendliness, if the distribution of the allowed quotas
is more equitable. But, if the consumer friendliness is small, for high (small) values of α, the firm 1 (0)
would obtain larger profits with the tax while the rival would obtain larger profits with the permits.445
Proposition 15. For any 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1:
1. pitaxn0 < pi
tpn∗
0 if α > max{αnc0(θ), 0}, where αnc0(θ) is such that pitaxn0 (αnc0) = pitpn∗0 (αnc0).
2. pitaxn1 < pi
tpn∗
1 if α < min{αnc1(θ), 1}, where αnc1(θ) is such that pitaxn1 (αnc1) = pitpn∗1 (αnc1).
25
(a) Firm 0’s profit comparison (b) Firm 1’s profit comparison
Figure C.3: Comparison of profits in non-committed policies: tradable emission permits vs emission tax
Finally, we can see that the environmental damage is the same as in (23) regardless of the value of
α while the welfare depends on α:
W tpn∗ =
1320624− 1202904θ + 377055θ2 − 43908θ3 − 508θ4 + 466θ5 − 25θ6
+ 4α(5− θ) (36− 9θ + θ2) (180 + 15θ − 22θ2 + 2θ3)− 4α2(5− θ)2 (36− 9θ + θ2)2
Ω2
(C.7)
Proposition 16. ∂ED
tpn
∂θ > 0 for any θ ∈ [0, 1] but ∂W
tpn
∂θ
>
< if θ
<
>θWd(α).
Note that W tpn∗ is concave on α and thus it is maximized at αtpn∗ = 180+15θ−22θ
2+2θ3
2(180−81θ+14θ2−θ3) ≥ 12 , which450
increases in θ (α = 12 if θ = 0). This represents that discriminatory emission quota is efficient in the
presence of a consumer-friendly firm. It also implies that the regulator should allow a larger emission
quota to the consumer-friendly firm and the quota should be higher for higher values of consumer-
friendliness.
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